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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

equity case, the jury will serve only in an advisory capacity unless both parties have clearly
consented to accept a jury verdict. Romrell v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah
1980).
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceeding where the jury was retained merely as an
advisory jury to consider the sole question of
the reasonableness of plaintiffs reliance on defendant's act. Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
Trial by consent
—Equity.
Motion for directed verdict
Where the case was essentially one in equity
but the parties and court appeared to have consented to presenting their case to a jury whose
verdict would have "the same effect as if trial
by jury had been a matter of right," under Subdivision (c), the determination of whether a directed verdict was proper was to be tested by
the same rules governing cases at law. Willard
M M " " * Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah
Trial by court
Waiver of bench trial.
Even though former statute providing for
trial by court in absence of demand for jury
was couched in mandatory terms, and a party
might have an absolute right to have the issues tried by the court, the right could be

waived, as by proceeding to trial before a jury.
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler. 47
Utah 215, 152 P. 726 (1915).
—Waiver of jury trial.
Where it did not appear that any demand for
a j u r y t r i a l w a s m a d e o r t h a t ^ y objection or
exception was made at any time during trial
a g a i n s t right 0 f the court to try the case witho u t a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that
a t r i a l by jury was waived. Perego v. Dodge, 9
U t a h 3 33 p 2 2l (1893), aff d, 163 U.S. 160, 16
s

Ct

971> 4 1 L

Ed> 1 1 3

(1896)

Trial by jury.
—Grant of jury trial.
Absence of demand.
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over
plaintiffs objections although defendant had
not made proper demand for jury trial under
Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced
thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964).
—Right
^
dfle action
This rule gives the right to have any legal
issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper demand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on
issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11,
327 p.2d 250 (1958).
Cited in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.,
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 57,
75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 714 et seq.
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 98 to 105; 88
C.J.S. Trial §§ 20, 203, 547 et seq.
A.L.R. — When does jeopardy attach in a
non-jury trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1039.
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b)
58;

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing it to order jury trial notwithstanding
party's failure to make seasonable demand for
j u r y , 6 A.L.R. Fed. 217.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 25; Trial *=> 10,
134) 3 6 7 e t seq.

Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the
trial; and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
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Rule 40

effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and
(B)].
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amendment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule
32(c)(3)(A) and (B).

Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule
40, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, continuance upon,
U.R.CP. 15(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Postponement.
—In general.
—Absence of party.
—Discretion of court.
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
Unavoidable absence.
—New theory of case.
—Procedural delays.
—Supporting affidavits.
—Unavailable witness.
Lack of diligence.
Need.
Cited.
Postponement.
—In general.
To grant one party continuance after continuance to the prejudice of the other party would
be patently unfair. This is especially true when
such continuances are being granted to the
plaintiff who has triggered the time constraints of litigation by bringing the suit in the
first place. It is equally unfair to allow a party
to name new witnesses several days before
trial. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
—Absence of party.
Continuance would not be granted because
of absence of a party, unless he was a material
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be
proved by him had to be stated under oath,
unless the oath was waived. It was also necessary that party had used due diligence to be
present at the trial. McGrath v. Tallent, 7
Utah 256, 26 P. 574 (1891).
Refusal of trial court to postpone trial was
not abuse of discretion where case was set
down for trial, and had once before been continued because of absence of party who was
principal witness, and second continuance was
sought by attorney who was not of record in
case. Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P.
914 (1909).
Refusal to grant continuance in personal injury case was an abuse of discretion where
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial because of his physical condition, there was no
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373
P.2d 375 (1962).
—Discretion of court.
Denial of motion for continuance was within
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924).
Trial courts have substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances.

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1988).
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
The inability of counsel to be present at the
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Unavoidable absence.
When counsel has made timely objections,
given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
—New theory of case.
Continuance could be obtained to develop a
theory of the case suggested after issue joined
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah
393 (1877).
—Procedural delays.
Court properly denied motion for continuance in action based on credit card obligation
which had been procedurally delayed for two
and a half years by interrogatories and by various motions of the defendant: and although
trial date had been set for four months, motion
for continuance was not filed until nine days
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975).
—Supporting affidavits.
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
—Unavailable witness.
Lack of diligence.
Where subpoena for absent witness was not
placed in hands of an officer for service until
the morning the case was called for trial,
though it had been set for several weeks, and
the witness had testified at a former trial, continuance was denied. Corporation of Members
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906).
In malpractice action, motion for continuance based on plaintiffs inability to serve
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no
effort to depose witness and had never contacted witness for the purpose of testifying.
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1975).
After plaintiff had been granted one continuance because of unavailability of her preferred expert witness, and her second request
for a continuance several months later was
solely due to her own failure to retain and designate a new expert witness in a timely man-
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set aside must proffer some defense of at least
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on
that issue. Downey State Bank v. MajorBlakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).
—Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a
summons, and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original, the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should have been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
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promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)».
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

Rule 56- Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the

xuue oo
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.

Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S RULING

L. DIANE TURNER,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

910903939

vs.
CRAIG H. MCQUEEN, M.D., and
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES
& SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC,
Defendants.

A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule
4-501,

Code

of Judicial

Administration,

in

connection

with

defendants/ Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion
for Extension of Time to Designate an Expert, the Court having
reviewed the Motions, Affidavits and Memorandum in support and
Reply Memorandum

and the Memorandum

in opposition, and the

relevant law and being fully advised and finding good cause,
rules as stated herein.
The plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Designate
Expert was made on or about September 21, 1992.
time

for

discovery

designation
cut-off

of

was

experts

was

July

October

9,

1992.

The cut-off

31,

1992.

Dr.

The

Home's

000152

TURNER V. MCQUEEN

PAGE TWO

RULING

letter to plaintiff's counsel is dated September 11, 1992.

The

trial in this matter is set for November 3 0 and has been since
July 20, 1992.

The Court finds given these dates that the

Motion is not timely or well-taken and denies the same.
The defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment

is granted.

The Court finds there are no material issues of fact precluding
Summary

Judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

The

law

requires

plaintiff to establish a violation of the medical standard of
care by expert testimony and the plaintiff's designated expert,
Dr.

Home,

violation.

indicates

he

will

Therefore, plaintiff

not

testify

cannot

meet

as

to

such

its burden

a
of

proof.

000153
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DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975)
ELIZABETH KING (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Craig
H. McQueen, M.D.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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DEC 1 7 1992

Dbpuiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
L. DIANE TURNER,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 910903939PI
CRAIG H. MCQUEEN, M.D., and
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES &
SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
This matter having been submitted for ruling pursuant to
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion
for Extension of Time to Designate an Expert, the Court, having
reviewed the Motions, Affidavits and Memorandum in support and
the Memorandum in Opposition, and the Reply Memorandum, and the
relevant law, and being fully advised, and finding good cause,
rules as follows:

000155

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This is a medical malpractice case arising out of

arthroscopic knee surgery rendered to L. Diane Turner by Dr.
Craig McQueen on June 19, 1989.
2.

On August 10, 1989, plaintiff served a Notice of Intent

to Commence a Malpractice Action against Dr. McQueen.
3.

On August 23, 1989, plaintiff filed a Request for

Prelitigation Review alleging that the respondents owed a duty to
L. Diane Turner to treat and care for her in a manner that was
consistent with the standards of the medical community in which
they practice and that said respondents failed in their duty to
properly treat and care for L. Diane Turner.
4.

A prelitigation screening panel hearing was held as

required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1953 as amended) on
November 2, 1989.
5.

A Summons and Complaint was served on defendants on June

24, 1991, and an Answer was timely filed.
6.

Interrogatories were served by defendants on July 2,

1991, and a Second Set of Interrogatories specifically seeking
information as to expert witnesses were served on January 29,
1992.
7.

In response to the Second Set of Interrogatories,

plaintiff identified Robert Home, M.D. as the only expert
witness prepared to testify regarding the standard of care.

-2-
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8.

In addition, defendants took the plaintiff's deposition

on January 24, 1992, at which time she testified that Dr. Home
had never expressed any criticism of the care rendered by Dr.
McQueen.
9.

On the Court's own motion, a scheduling conference was

held on July 20, 1992. During that scheduling conference the
parties agreed to the following dates:

(a) Plaintiff's witnesses

(expert and otherwise) to be designated on July 31, 1992; (b)
Defendants' expert witnesses (expert and otherwise) to be
designated on August 10, 1992; (c) Discovery cut-off October 9,
1992 and (d) four-day jury trial set for November 30, 1992.
10.

On July 31, 1992, plaintiff designated Dr. Robert Home

as the only medical expert witness prepared to testify on her
behalf.
11.

On August 7, 1992, defendants designed their experts

and other medical witnesses.
12.

On September 11, 1992, defendants moved for summary

judgment on the grounds plaintiff failed to produce competent
expert testimony necessary to prevail on her medical malpractice
claim.

Specifically, the evidence before the court was that the

expert allegedly designated by the plaintiff, Dr. Robert Home,
had refused to testify on her behalf, and in fact believed the
standards of care to have been met by the defendants.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by
Affidavits from both Dr. Home and Dr. Sherman Coleman.
-3-

000157

13.

On September 21, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and moved
for an extension of time in which to designate an expert witness,
based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).
14.

On September 23, 1992, defendants filed a Reply

Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
15.

Further pleadings ensued, including a response to

defendants1 Reply, a Supplemental Memorandum in support of the
Motion for Summary Judgment, and an Affidavit filed by Elizabeth
King.

The matter was submitted for decision pursuant to Rule 4-

501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
16.

There is no evidence that the plaintiff or her attorney

confirmed that Dr. Home would act as her expert witness,
testifying that the standard of care was not met by the defendant
Dr. McQueen.

The evidence indicates that Dr. H o m e first learned

that he had been appointed in this role when the defendants1
attorneys called him to schedule his deposition.
17.

The irrefuted evidence indicates Dr. H o m e objected to

being designated as an expert witness and claimed he was not
critical of the care rendered.

Further, there is no evidence

before the Court that Dr. Home had changed his mind or his
position with regard to this question; he had simply never been
asked to be plaintiff's expert witness.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
following
-4-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This action is a medical malpractice action against a

health care provider which is governed by case law requiring
expert testimony establishing a deviation from requisite
standards of care which resulted in harm to the plaintiff.
2.

This Court finds as a matter of law that there is

insufficient evidence before the Court to support a prima facie
claim against the defendants and, therefore, plaintiff cannot
meet her burden of proof.

Specifically, plaintiff's designated

expert Dr. Home, indicates he will not testify as to a violation
of the medical standard of care.

Without such testimony,

plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law and defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Designate

an Expert is untimely and is not well-taken in that the Motion
was filed a full six weeks after the cut-off time for plaintiff's
designation of experts.

The Motion for an Extension is not

supported by the facts or by case law.

Plaintiff triggered the

time constraints by filing her Notice to Commence a Medical
Malpractice Claim against defendants.

She had ample time and

ample forewarning that she was required to produce expert
testimony regarding the standard of care, a prima facie element
of her case in chief.

The Court finds and hereby holds that

defendants should not be required to bear the burden of
plaintiff's laxity, and finds no basis for a continuance.
-5-

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, as well as on the pleadings before the Court, the Court
denies the plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to
Designate an Expert Witness, and grants the defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, and orders that plaintiff's Complaint be,
and the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its
^ L

own costs.
DATED this

/ / day of December,^ 1!
BY THE COURTS

iieslie A.

Third Distri

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

J. Ray Barrios
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Addendum to Brief of Appellees were mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, on the &7

day of June, 1993 to:

J. Ray Barrios, P.C.
First American Title Building
330 East 400 South, Sute 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

<£Z^£b&

^ a v i d w. Slagl(e
Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellees

